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Equality, Animus, and Expressive and Religious Freedom
Under the American Constitution: Masterpiece Cakeshop and Beyond
DANIEL O. CONKLE*
The American Constitution values both equality and freedom. The Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, for example, forbids discrimination on
various grounds, including race and sex. For its part, the First Amendment protects the
most treasured of American freedoms: freedom of speech and freedom of religion. The
First Amendment, like the Fourteenth, applies only to governmental action; neither
amendment directly controls the private sector. Even so, Congress and other legislative
bodies, acting by statute, can promote equality or freedom in ways that the Constitution
permits but does not require. And this legislative action can extend to private businesses
and other private actors.
The sometimes competing demands of equality and freedom can generate intense
controversy, with one value or the other ultimately prevailing. In the Twentieth Century,
for example, ending deeply embedded practices of racial discrimination required that
business owners give up a measure of freedom, the freedom to choose their employees
and clientele as they see fit. In a momentous development, Congress enacted the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited racial discrimination in various private-sector
contexts.1 The Supreme Court upheld the Act against constitutional challenges,2
including an objection grounded on religious freedom.3 The Court recently reaffirmed
this judgment, making it clear that religious freedom generally must give way to the
prevention of racial discrimination.4
The Civil Rights Act also included prohibitions on religious and sex-based
discrimination, and state and local legislatures—exercising their authority under the
American system of federalism—have gone further. More than twenty states, plus dozens
of cities in these states and elsewhere, have enacted legislation barring discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity and have extended these prohibitions to
*
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Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241.
2
See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
3
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402–03 n.5 (1968) (per curiam)
(rejecting religious freedom claim of restaurant owners who objected to serving black customers).
4
See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2783 (2014) (declaring that racial
discrimination in employment cannot “be cloaked as religious practice to escape legal sanction”).

places of “public accommodation,” that is, private businesses that serve the general
public. Under these laws, the covered businesses are barred from discriminating against
gay, lesbian, or transgender individuals in the provision of goods or services. These state
and local laws, combined with the advent of same-sex marriage,5 have generated
religious-freedom objections, mainly from religiously conservative wedding vendors. The
wedding vendors, including bakers, florists, and photographers, contend that the First
Amendment requires an exception to the anti-discrimination laws, one that protects their
freedom to deny goods or services to same-sex couples for the celebration of weddings
that the vendors regard as religiously impermissible.
The wedding vendor controversy replicates the debate surrounding the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, and it presents a similar question: which should prevail, the
promotion of equality or a competing claim of individual freedom? But the current
debate, as a matter of constitutional doctrine, has taken peculiar turns. In the first place,
religious objectors have joined their claims of religious freedom with claims of
expressive freedom, thus relying on each of two provisions in the First Amendment: the
Free Exercise Clause, which protects the free exercise of religion, and the Free Speech
Clause, which includes a prohibition on compelled speech. Second, the objectors,
ironically, have met the equality claim of same-sex couples with an equality claim of
their own, contending that religious equality requires the government to grant religious
exemptions from anti-discrimination laws, at least if the government grants nonreligious
exemptions or otherwise is shown to have acted with animus or hostility to religion in
rejecting the objectors’ arguments.
In this Essay, I will attempt to untangle the constitutional strands of the current
controversy and explain how and why they have come together as they have. I will begin
by sketching the contours of contemporary American law with respect to the free exercise
of religion. As we will see, the Supreme Court’s 1990 decision in Employment Division v.
Smith,6 designed to simplify the law, instead has led to complexity and confusion. Next, I will
outline the Court’s interpretation of the Free Speech Clause, highlighting the
constitutional prohibition on compelled speech. I then will turn to the wedding vendor
issue and the Supreme Court’s widely publicized 2018 decision in Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission,7 which confronted this issue
without squarely resolving it. My discussion will highlight the ambiguities in the Court’s
reasoning and the questions that remain unsettled.
The questions left open in Masterpiece are likely to return to the Supreme Court,
5

Initially recognized in some states but not others, same-sex marriage became a nationwide
constitutional right in 2015, when the Supreme Court decided Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584
(2015).
6
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
7
138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).

and, in the remainder of the Essay, I will offer three suggestions for resolving them when
they do. First, the Court should reject the wedding vendors’ compelled speech argument.
Second, the Court should repudiate Smith and reinstate its earlier, more generous
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause, according to which religious objectors have a
presumptive—but not absolute—constitutional right to religious exemptions from laws
that substantially burden the exercise of religion. But third, in applying this interpretation
in the wedding vendor context, the Court should conclude, as it has for racial
discrimination in similar settings, that preventing discrimination against same-sex
couples outweighs the competing value of religious freedom, so the religious objectors
cannot be excused from the challenged laws and instead must comply. My second and
third suggestions, taken together, would permit the wedding vendor controversy to be
framed and resolved transparently, as the conflict of competing values that it is: equality
on the one hand, religious freedom on the other.
I. THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE: EQUALITY AND FREEDOM
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment protects the “free exercise” of
religion. As construed by the Supreme Court, the Clause protects both religious equality
and religious freedom.
Religious equality generally precludes the government from discriminating against
religion, or any particular religion, in the conferral of legal benefits or in the imposition
of legal burdens. In other words, the government generally cannot target religious
individuals, organizations, or practices, as such, for special disadvantage. 8 In McDaniel v.
Paty,9 for example, the Supreme Court ruled that the Free Exercise Clause precluded
Tennessee from disqualifying clergy members from serving as lawmakers. 10 Likewise, in
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,11 the Court found that a
Florida city’s ban on animal sacrifice was intended and designed to regulate a Santería
religious practice, as such, and therefore violated the Free Exercise Clause. To this
extent, the Free Exercise Clause is like the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, forbidding a particular sort of purposeful or deliberate governmental
discrimination.
8

See D. O. CONKLE, Religion, Law, and the Constitution, Foundation Press, 2016, p. 55. In fact, a
general (albeit not categorical) prohibition on religion-based discrimination is found not only in the Free
Exercise Clause but also in the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. See ibid., p. 57–60.
9
435 U.S. 618 (1978).
10
See also Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017) (holding
that Missouri violated the Free Exercise Clause when it refused to provide a playground resurfacing grant
to a church simply because it was a religious organization); Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue,
140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020) (holding that Montana violated the Free Exercise Clause when it excluded
religiously affiliated schools from a state scholarship program providing private-school tuition
assistance).
11
508 U.S. 520 (1993).

Animus-based discrimination against religion is an especially egregious form of
religious discrimination. Animus-based lawmaking targets religion for disadvantage
without any plausible justification, such as preventing tangible harm or preserving the
separation of church and state. Instead, it targets religion, or religious individuals or
groups, on the basis of nothing more than bias, dislike, or hostility toward the religious
beliefs in question or against the people who hold them.12 In a recent case challenging
presidential travel restrictions, for instance, the challengers argued that the restrictions
were purposefully designed to discriminate against Muslims and were motivated by
nothing more than President Trump’s religious animus against them.13
Religious equality is a widely accepted constitutional value, resting at the core of
the Free Exercise Clause. As a result, it is generally agreed that the Clause forbids most
forms of governmental discrimination against religion, including but not limited to
animus-based lawmaking.
The Free Exercise Clause also protects religious freedom. This protection
sometimes goes beyond religious equality by requiring the government to accommodate
the free exercise of religion—that is, to exempt religious practices from otherwise
applicable laws—even when secular practices receive no comparable protection. This
special accommodation can be seen to discriminate in religion’s favor, and, as a result, it
is more controversial than the protection of religious equality. Indeed, religious
accommodation itself is constitutionally limited by the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment, which generally forbids the government from promoting religion. Properly
understood, however, the accommodation of free exercise through the conferral of
religious exemptions does not promote religion. Rather, it promotes religious freedom, a
basic constitutional value. More precisely, it honors the constitutional value of religious
voluntarism, that is, the freedom of individuals to make religious decisions for
themselves, free from governmental compulsion or improper influence. This value can be
12

Even outside the context of religion, animus-based lawmaking—lawmaking based merely on
bias, dislike, or hostility—violates deep-seated constitutional understandings and should be regarded as
categorically impermissible. Notably, the Supreme Court has relied on this principle to protect gays and
lesbians, among others, from discriminatory laws. For a helpful account, see W. D. ARAIZA, Animus: A
Short Introduction to Bias in the Law, NYU Press, 2017. Judicial declarations of animus, however, are
highly contentious and inflammatory, because they entail a legal and moral condemnation of the
lawmakers in question. For this reason among others, I have argued elsewhere that the Supreme Court
should avoid declarations of animus when it can, for example, if the challenged law is subject to
invalidation on other grounds. See D. O. CONKLE, « Animus and Its Alternatives: Constitutional Principle
and Judicial Prudence », Stetson L. Rev., vol. 48, 2019, p. 195.
13
Claiming an Establishment Clause violation, the challengers presented powerful evidence of
presidential animus, but the Supreme Court, citing separation-of-powers considerations, applied
deferential review and rejected the challengers’ claim. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2416–23
(2018).

imperiled when laws substantially burden the exercise of religion even if they do not
target religion and therefore do not violate religious equality. Accordingly, a Free
Exercise Clause requirement of religious accommodation—within limits—should not be
understood to violate the Establishment Clause.14
Prior to 1990, the Supreme Court honored the value of religious voluntarism by
interpreting the Free Exercise Clause to favor religious accommodation—within limits.
In particular, the Court read the Clause to require close constitutional scrutiny of laws
that imposed substantial burdens on religiously motivated conduct, scrutiny that
sometimes resulted in constitutionally required exemptions for the religious believers
whose freedom the laws impaired. More precisely, a religious exemption was required
unless the government could satisfy a constitutional test of “strict scrutiny” by showing
that the challenged law served a “compelling” governmental interest that demanded the
law’s application, without exception, even to the religious objector.15 This test was
difficult but not impossible for the government to satisfy. As a result, the Court granted
some exemption claims but rejected others. For example, the Court granted religious
objectors relief from various work requirements in the context of unemployment
compensation,16 and it exempted members of an Amish community from a requirement
that they send their children to high school.17 Conversely, the Court rejected other
exemption claims, including that of an Amish employer who objected to paying social
security taxes for his employees18 and, notably, that of religious schools seeking taxexempt status despite their violation of a governmental policy forbidding racial
discrimination.19
In 1990, the Supreme Court’s doctrine took a dramatic turn. In its landmark
decision in Employment Division v. Smith,20 the Court abandoned its strong, albeit
qualified, support for religious accommodation under the Free Exercise Clause. Instead,
the Court broadly declared that “the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual
of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the
ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or

14

See D. O. CONKLE, Religion, Law, and the Constitution, op. cit., p. 172–73. Even when
accommodation is not required by the Free Exercise Clause, it is permissible, within limits, in the
discretion of the government. See ibid., p. 173–88.
15
See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215
(1972).
16
Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398; Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Commission, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment
Security, 489 U.S. 829 (1989).
17
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205.
18
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
19
Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
20
494 U.S. 872 (1990).

proscribes).’”21 On this view, the Free Exercise Clause simply does not require religious
exemptions, no matter how great the burden on religious freedom and regardless of
whether the government is pursuing a compelling objective.
The Court’s new doctrine was designed to simplify the law. Yet even as it
announced its decision, the Court in Smith introduced significant elements of ambiguity
by reinterpreting, rather than overruling, its prior holdings. In so doing, the Court
suggested that its new approach to the Free Exercise Clause was subject to at least two
caveats or exceptions, albeit of vague and uncertain scope. In each of these two
situations, religious exemptions would still be required unless the government could
satisfy strict scrutiny.
The first exception, applicable in so-called “hybrid situations,” addresses cases in
which the religious objector relies not only on religious freedom but also on some other
claim of constitutional right. Whether this hybrid-claim exception makes sense, and
exactly how the dual constitutional claims are to be aggregated, are questions that have
never been fully answered. But the recognition of this exception in Smith permitted the
Court to preserve, rather than overrule, its earlier decision exempting the Amish from
compulsory high school. In that case, the Court explained, there was a claim of parental
rights as well as religious freedom.22
The second exception, grounded in the Free Exercise Clause alone, is what I will
call the comparable-treatment exception. The scope of this exception is quite uncertain,
but it sometimes requires a religious exemption when the law in question exempts or
excludes comparable secular conduct. The exception thus draws upon, even as it expands,
the core requirement of religious equality by suggesting that religious conduct sometimes
warrants protection even when there is no targeted, purposeful discrimination against it.
As initially introduced in Smith, the comparable-treatment exception was designed to
preserve the Court’s pre-Smith unemployment compensation rulings, and it seemingly
was confined to that and similar settings involving “individualized governmental
assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct.”23 As the Court explained, “our
decisions in the unemployment cases stand for the proposition that where the State has in
place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases
of ‘religious hardship’ without compelling reason.”24
Three years after Smith, however, the Court clouded—and arguably expanded—
the scope of the comparable-treatment exception in Lukumi, the animal sacrifice case. As
21

Ibid., p. 879, quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S., p. 263 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment).
22
See ibid., p. 881–82.
23
Ibid., p. 884.
24
Ibid., quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986) (plurality opinion).

noted earlier, the Court in Lukumi found purposeful discrimination against the Santería
religion, a clear violation of religious equality. But the Court’s opinion went further,
emphasizing that the no-exemptions doctrine of Smith applies only to “generally
applicable” laws and suggesting that (whatever the government’s purpose) a law might
not qualify as “generally applicable” if it includes secular exemptions or exclusions, even
ones that are categorical rather than individualized or discretionary. 25 Under a broad
reading of Lukumi’s discussion of “general applicability,” the comparable-treatment
exception to Smith might be triggered by the presence of secular exemptions or
exclusions of any sort, thus demanding comparable religious exemptions unless the
government can satisfy strict scrutiny.26
Beyond these hybrid-claim and comparable-treatment exceptions, whatever their
scope and meaning, the Supreme Court recently has recognized a third exception to the
rule of Smith, an exception designed to protect the institutional autonomy of religious
institutions. Thus, the Court in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School
v. EEOC27 ruled that the Free Exercise Clause gives religious organizations the right to
hire and fire ministers and other religious leaders as they see fit, without regard to
otherwise applicable employment discrimination laws.28 The Court conceded that the
challenged laws were “neutral and generally applicable” within the meaning of Smith, but
it found Smith inapplicable and ruled that a religious exemption was constitutionally
required.29
Since Smith, the American law of religious exemptions has been further
complicated by developments in Congress, state legislatures, and state courts. The
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA),30 a congressional statute,
effectively supersedes Smith in the federal-law context. As the law’s title suggests, RFRA
“restores” the pre-Smith approach to religious exemptions, now as a matter of statutory
law rather than constitutional right. Accordingly, RFRA requires religious exemptions
from federal laws that substantially burden the exercise of religion unless the government

25

See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 542–46 (1993).
Under this interpretation, “[i]f there are exceptions for secular interests, the religious claimant
has to be treated as favorably as those who benefit from the secular exceptions.” D. LAYCOCK, « The
Supreme Court and Religious Liberty », Cath. Law., vol. 40, 2000, p. 25, p. 35; see ibid., p. 25–36.
27
565 U.S. 171 (2012).
28
In fact, the Court found that this “ministerial exception” from employment discrimination laws
was required by both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. Ibid., p. 181, p. 188–89.
29
Ibid., p. 189–90. Indeed, the Court found that in this setting religious organizations are entitled
to absolute, not presumptive, constitutional protection, so the government cannot overcome the
exemption, not even by claiming a compelling justification. See ibid., p. 196. The Supreme Court
reaffirmed and extended Hosanna-Tabor in Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S.
Ct. 2049 (2020).
30
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb–4.
26

can satisfy strict scrutiny. State laws are not subject to the federal RFRA, 31 but they are
subject to another federal statute, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act of 2000 (RLUIPA).32 RLUIPA reimposes pre-Smith standards in two discrete statelaw settings: land-use regulations, and regulations affecting prisoners and other
institutionalized persons.
Twenty-one states have gone further, extending the pre-Smith approach to a full
range of state laws by adopting their own, state-law RFRAs. And state courts in other
states have achieved the same result as a matter of state constitutional law. All in all,
some thirty or more states have either adopted state-law RFRAs or have interpreted their
state constitutions to afford similar protection.33 The remaining states are bound by
RLUIPA in its selective areas of coverage, but they are free to reject claims for
exemptions from other state laws as long as they comply with Smith’s interpretation of
the Free Exercise Clause. As we have seen, Smith generally precludes exemption claims,
but it is subject to the three exceptions noted earlier, exceptions that are themselves of
uncertain scope.
Rather than simplify the law of free exercise, Smith and its aftermath have created
a patchwork, indeed, a veritable maze of complexity. Thus, religious objectors might find
their claims rejected under the rule of Smith, but then again they might not—depending
on the jurisdiction, the subject-matter of the challenged law, and the possible application
of one of Smith’s indeterminate exceptions.
II. THE FREE SPEECH CLAUSE AND COMPELLED SPEECH
The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment protects “the freedom of speech.”
This provision protects religious as well as nonreligious speech. It also extends to nonverbal expression, that is, expressive conduct that communicates a message without the
use of words as such. Burning an American flag as an act of political protest, for instance,
has been protected as a form of symbolic expression.34
The Free Speech Clause provides only limited protection against the contentneutral regulation of speech or expression. Under prevailing Supreme Court doctrine,
content-neutral laws—laws that restrict speech or expression without regard to its
particular message or subject matter—are subject to First Amendment review, but they
typically are evaluated under a relatively lenient balancing test. Under this test, the
31

See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (ruling that Congress exceeded the scope of
its constitutional power in attempting to extend RFRA to the states).
32
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc–5.
33
For elaboration and documentation of these state-law developments, see D. O. CONKLE,
Religion, Law, and the Constitution, op. cit., p. 145–51.
34
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).

government is free to engage in content-neutral regulation if the regulation is “narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest,” 35 a test that is satisfied as long as
the government’s interest is “sufficiently substantial” and the restriction on expression is
not “substantially broader than necessary” to protect that governmental interest.36 Under
this constitutional test, the government has considerable room to regulate the time, place,
or manner of expression, for instance, by imposing content-neutral restrictions on the size
or location of billboards37 or by prohibiting excessive noise.38 As long as such laws are
not unduly restrictive, they are likely to be upheld.
By contrast, it generally is unconstitutional for the government to engage in
content-based regulation, that is, regulation that targets speech or expression because of
its message or subject matter. Such regulation typically can be justified only if it is
necessary to serve a “compelling” governmental interest, a test of strict scrutiny that is at
least as strong as the pre-Smith constitutional test under the Free Exercise Clause and
that, indeed, may very well be stronger.39 Even so, in this context as in that one, a
sufficiently powerful governmental justification can satisfy strict scrutiny, thus permitting
the law to stand. For example, the Supreme Court has upheld the content-based
regulation of speech that provides material support to foreign terrorist organizations,40
and it has ruled that states can bar judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign
funds, a content-based restriction that, according to the Court, is necessary to ensure
public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.41
Notably, the Supreme Court has ruled that the Free Speech Clause protects not
only the right to speak, but also the right to refrain from speaking. The constitutional law
surrounding issues of compelled speech is complex, uncertain, and unsettled.42 At its
core, however, the Court’s doctrine presumptively forbids the government from dictating
the content of speech or symbolic expression by forcing citizens to express messages or
opinions with which they disagree. Speech compulsions of this sort are treated as content-

35

Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 805, 808 (1984). The test for
content-neutral regulation is essentially the same regardless of whether the regulation affects verbal
expression or nonverbal expression, such as symbolic acts of communication. See United States v.
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968); Clark, 468 U.S., p. 298.
37
See Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S., p. 806–07 (suggesting that the First Amendment would
permit even a complete prohibition on billboards as long as the prohibition was content-neutral).
38
See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (upholding a prohibition on “loud and raucous”
sound trucks).
39
See, e.g., Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, 564 U.S. 786, 799–805 (2011); Reed
v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226–27 (2015).
40
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 25–39 (2010).
41
Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1665–73 (2015).
42
See E. VOLOKH, « The Law of Compelled Speech », Tex. L. Rev., vol. 97, 2018, p. 355.
36

based regulations that, like comparable speech restrictions, trigger strict scrutiny. 43 This
presumptive protection against compelled speech extends to religious as well as
nonreligious objectors. In its 1943 decision in West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette,44 for example, the Supreme Court held that public schools could not require
school children to salute the American flag or to recite the Pledge of Allegiance. The
successful challengers were Jehovah’s Witnesses, who claimed that the state was
requiring them to violate their religion by worshiping a “graven image.” The Court’s
decision, however, protected all children who refused to participate in the flag salute or
pledge, whatever their reason.45 Decades later, the Court reaffirmed and extended
Barnette in another case brought by Jehovah’s Witnesses, ruling that the State of New
Hampshire could not require objecting citizens—religious or nonreligious—to display the
state’s motto, “Live Free or Die,” on their automobile license plates.46
The strict scrutiny that governs content-based speech compulsions is at least as
strong as the test for content-based speech restrictions.47 But the protection here, as
elsewhere, remains presumptive rather than absolute; it can be overridden by a
“sufficiently compelling” justification.48
III. MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP
The complexities and permutations of contemporary free exercise and free speech
law—along with the vagaries of American federalism—have come to the fore in recent
wedding vendor controversies, including the Masterpiece Cakeshop case, which reached
the Supreme Court in 2018.49 Masterpiece Cakeshop is a small Colorado corporation that
is owned by baker Jack Phillips and his wife.50 Citing his religious objection to same-sex
marriage, Phillips refused the request of a gay couple, Charlie Craig and David Mullins,
that he create a custom-made cake for their same-sex wedding reception. Throughout
As the Court has explained, “compelling individuals to speak a particular message” alters the
content of their expression and therefore qualifies as a “content-based regulation of speech.” National
Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 (2018).
44
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
45
See ibid., p. 634–35, p. 642.
46
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
47
Cf. Barnette, 319 U.S., p. 633 (suggesting that “involuntary affirmation” may demand “even
more immediate and urgent grounds” of justification than “censorship or suppression of expression of
opinion”).
48
Wooley, 430 U.S., p. 716.
49
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
50
Phillips, as an individual, and Masterpiece, as a corporation, both were parties to the case. But
their legal positions were essentially identical, and the Supreme Court drew no distinction between them.
Cf. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2767–75 (2014) (permitting closely held
corporations to assert religious freedom claims). For convenience, I will refer to Phillips and not to
Masterpiece.
43

much of the United States, such a refusal, whether or not religiously grounded, would
have been entirely lawful. There is no federal prohibition on sexual-orientation
discrimination in places of public accommodation,51 and fewer than half of the states
have extended their public accommodation laws in this manner. But this case arose in
Colorado, one of the states that has. More precisely, Phillips was subject to the Colorado
Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA), which prohibits discrimination on various grounds,
including sexual orientation, in any “place of business engaged in any sales to the public
and any place offering services… to the public.”52 Invoking this statute, Craig and
Mullins filed a charge with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. After multiple
hearings, the Commission ruled in the couple’s favor, and the Colorado Court of Appeals
affirmed the Commission’s decision.53
Not surprisingly, Phillips relied on religious freedom in resisting the Colorado
law, arguing that he should be exempted from CADA in the circumstances at hand. But
his religious freedom objection was complicated and frustrated by the piecemeal pattern
of free exercise law that, as explained previously, has arisen in the aftermath of
Employment Division v. Smith.54 Because CADA is a state law, not federal, Phillips could
not rely on the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),55 which restored the
pre-Smith approach to religious exemptions in the federal-law context. Likewise
inapplicable was the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA),56
which extends only to state laws involving land use or institutionalized persons. Phillips
still could have invoked the pre-Smith approach if, like a majority of the states, Colorado
had elected to adopt that approach as a matter of state law. In fact, however, Colorado has
neither enacted a state-law RFRA nor construed its state constitution in a similar fashion.
As a result, Phillips was forced to rely exclusively on the First Amendment, which
brought him face-to-face with Smith, according to which the Free Exercise Clause
generally does not require religious exemptions.
Circumventing Smith would require creative legal arguments, and Phillips and his
advocates and allies were up to the task. First, Phillips advanced the novel claim that he
was a “cake artist” who was protected not only by the Free Exercise Clause but also by
51

Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, addressing certain places of public accommodation,
forbids discrimination only “on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000a(a). By contrast, Title VII, addressing employment, includes a prohibition on sex-based
discrimination, and the Supreme Court has interpreted this prohibition to include employment
discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity. See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct.
1731 (2020).
52
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24–34–601; see Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct., p. 1725.
53
Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015), rev’d, 138 S. Ct.
1719 (2018).
54
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
55
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb–4.
56
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc–5.

the Free Speech Clause, including its prohibition on compelled speech. This argument
obviously implicated the hybrid-claim exception to Smith. But the argument went further,
contending that the Free Speech Clause, in itself, was sufficient to protect Phillips and
any other objecting “cake artist,” whether religious or not. In addition, citing Lukumi’s
discussion of “general applicability,”57 Phillips advanced a broad understanding of the
comparable-treatment exception to Smith, according to which the granting of secular
exemptions from a law triggers a presumptive right to religious exemptions as well. That
exception applied here, he argued, because the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, in
effect, had granted secular exemptions in similar circumstances when bakers had been
charged with violating CADA’s prohibition on religious discrimination. In support,
Phillips cited several recent decisions in which the Commission had rejected religious
discrimination claims against socially progressive bakers who, as a matter of conscience,
had refused requests from a conservative Christian customer to create and decorate cakes
bearing messages that opposed same-sex marriage on religious grounds. Finally, not to
leave any litigation stone unturned, Phillips advanced an even more contentious claim,
asserting that the Commission’s failure to accord his objection equal regard was not
merely the incidental byproduct of its rulings in the other cases. Instead, he argued, the
Commission had treated him unfairly by design, rejecting his objection on the basis of
religious animus and hostility toward Phillips and the religious beliefs that he espoused.
However contentious and convoluted these various arguments might seem, they
prevailed in the Supreme Court—but only to a degree. In a surprisingly lopsided, 7–2
ruling, the Court found in favor of Phillips, but the Court’s decision did little to resolve
the wedding vendor controversy more generally. Ironically, although the Court’s opinion
addressed broader issues, its judgment rested on Phillips’ most extreme and inflammatory
argument: that the Commission had dismissed Phillips’ objection on the basis of
constitutionally illicit religious animus against him.58 As discussed earlier, governmental
action grounded in religious animus is an especially pernicious form of purposeful
discrimination on the basis of religion, infringing the core Free Exercise Clause
requirement of religious equality. Like other aspects of the First Amendment, the
prohibition on purposeful religious discrimination is presumptive, not absolute. But the
Supreme Court’s finding of animus eliminated any possible argument that the
government had a compelling justification for its action.59 Rather, according to the Court,
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the Commission’s action was fatally contaminated by its bias and hostility against
Phillips and his conservative Christian beliefs, rendering its action irremediable. 60
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Masterpiece was authored by Justice Anthony
Kennedy, a centrist jurist who was well aware that he would soon be announcing his
retirement from the Court. Justice Kennedy apparently was seeking to preserve his legacy
as a judicial champion of the constitutional rights of gays and lesbians but also a strong
supporter of religious freedom.61 In any case, his Masterpiece opinion offered respectful
consideration, and a measure of hope, to each side of the ongoing cultural conflict
surrounding gay and lesbian rights, same-sex marriage, and religious freedom. Viewed in
this light, Kennedy’s opinion was itself a “masterpiece” of sorts. To be sure, Kennedy
ultimately ruled for Phillips on the basis of religious animus, but his opinion also
included a skeptical discussion of Phillips’ broader free speech and free exercise
arguments, noting the difficulties and complexities that they presented and highlighting
the strength of the government’s competing interest in protecting gays and lesbians from
discrimination.
In his compelled speech argument, Phillips contended that for him to create a cake
specifically for a same-sex wedding or wedding reception—even a cake bearing neither
words nor content-laden images—would be tantamount to his own endorsement of the
same-sex marriage. The usual test for expressive conduct or symbolic communication,
however, goes beyond the actor’s subjective understanding of his conduct to ask whether
reasonable observers would agree that the conduct in fact communicates in the manner
the actor believes.62 Here, it seems doubtful that reasonable observers would agree with
decision); see generally D. O. CONKLE, « Animus and Its Alternatives: Constitutional Principle and
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Phillips’ understanding of the meaning of his cakes, including, in particular, his belief
that each cake carries with it his own approval of the wedding. It therefore is not
surprising that Justice Kennedy described “the free speech aspect of this case” as
“difficult.”63 As Kennedy observed, “few persons who have seen a beautiful wedding
cake might have thought of its creation as an exercise of protected speech,”64 much less a
personal endorsement by the baker of the wedding for which the cake was made. 65 To be
sure, Kennedy went on to note the possible “application of constitutional freedoms in
new contexts,” and he added that “[i]f a baker refused to design a special cake with words
or images celebrating the marriage—for instance, a cake showing words with religious
meaning—that might be different from a refusal to sell any cake at all.” 66 And he later
called Phillips’ legal position “not unreasonable” in a discussion that included a
description of Phillips’ speech-related contentions.67 But Kennedy plainly was wary of
the compelled speech argument and its potentially far-reaching implications.68
With respect to the Free Exercise Clause as well, Justice Kennedy suggested that
factual variations might make a difference. Even so, he emphasized that “gay persons and
gay couples cannot be treated as social outcasts or as inferior in dignity and worth” and
that their interests in freedom and equality “must be given great weight and respect by the
courts” in the consideration of religious or other objections to same-sex marriage.69 More
specifically, he continued, “it is a general rule that such objections do not allow business
owners and other actors in the economy and in society to deny protected persons equal
access to goods and services under a neutral and generally applicable public
accommodations law.”70 Kennedy acknowledged that members of the clergy could not be
compelled to perform same-sex weddings71—a right of refusal that might be derived
from, or linked to, the institutional autonomy exception to Smith that the Court
63
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recognized in Hosanna-Tabor.72 But he emphasized that clergy were uniquely situated
and that the right to object must be carefully confined. Otherwise, “a long list of persons
who provide goods and services for marriages and weddings might refuse to do so for
gay persons, thus resulting in a community-wide stigma inconsistent with the history and
dynamics of civil rights laws that ensure equal access to goods, services, and public
accommodations.”73
After expressing his skeptical view of the general First Amendment arguments of
Phillips and other wedding vendors, however, Justice Kennedy moved on to his
surprising conclusion: that Phillips must prevail in the case at hand because the Colorado
Civil Rights Commission had shown illicit religious animus toward him. According to
Kennedy, the Commission had “compromised” the “neutral and respectful consideration
to which Phillips was entitled” by showing “elements of a clear and impermissible
hostility toward the sincere religious beliefs that motivated his objection.” 74 In other
words, the Commission, in supporting the equality claim of the gay couple, itself had
violated Phillips’ right to religious equality under the Free Exercise Clause. To justify
this counterintuitive holding, Justice Kennedy relied on the combination of two sets of
circumstances: first, statements made by members of the Commission during its
adjudicatory hearings in the case; and second, the Commission’s arguably disparate
decisions in the CADA cases in which other objecting bakers had successfully escaped
liability. As noted earlier, Phillips had cited those other CADA cases in contending that
CADA, in reality, was not “generally applicable” and that his exemption claim properly
fell within the comparable-treatment exception to Smith. For Kennedy, however, the
other CADA cases were significant because, in combination with the commissioners’
statements in Phillips’ own case, they supported an inference of religious animus.
According to Justice Kennedy, the record in Phillips’ case indicated that
“commissioners endorsed the view that religious beliefs cannot legitimately be carried
into the public sphere or commercial domain, implying that religious beliefs and persons
are less than fully welcome in Colorado’s business community.”75 He cited statements by
two members of the seven-member Commission. One said that “Phillips can believe
‘what he wants to believe,’ but cannot act on his religious beliefs ‘if he decides to do
business in the state’” and if “‘the law’s impacting his personal belief system, he needs to
look at being able to compromise.’”76 Kennedy observed that these statements, taken
alone, were open to various interpretations, but “they might be seen as inappropriate and
dismissive comments showing lack of due consideration for Phillips’ free exercise rights
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and the dilemma he faced.”77 And Kennedy found this unfavorable interpretation
confirmed by the following statement of a second commissioner, which he regarded as
obviously problematic:
“Freedom of religion and religion [have] been used to justify all kinds of
discrimination throughout history, whether it be slavery, whether it be the
holocaust, whether it be—I mean, we—we can list hundreds of situations where
freedom of religion has been used to justify discrimination. And to me it is one of
the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use to—to use their religion
to hurt others.”78
According to Justice Kennedy, this commissioner wrongly disparaged Phillips’ faith, not
only by describing his religious beliefs as despicable—comparable even to beliefs
supporting slavery and the holocaust—but also by characterizing his religion as “merely
rhetorical—something insubstantial and even insincere.”79
Kennedy noted that the comments of these two commissioners had triggered no
objection from other commissioners, nor, later, from the Colorado Court of Appeals. And
the sentiment expressed, he concluded, was “inappropriate for a Commission charged
with the solemn responsibility of fair and neutral enforcement of Colorado’s
antidiscrimination law—a law that protects against discrimination on the basis of religion
as well as sexual orientation.”80
The other CADA cases, according to Kennedy, provided “[a]nother indication of
hostility” toward Phillips and his religious views.81 As Kennedy explained, the
Commission on three occasions had permitted objecting bakers to refuse the request of a
conservative Christian customer for cakes bearing religious images and text disapproving
same-sex marriage,82 including, for example, the image of a Bible and the statement that
“[h]omosexuality is a detestable sin.”83 In these cases, the Commission had found no
77
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religious discrimination by the bakers, and therefore no violation of CADA, because the
bakers had been willing to provide the customer with other products and had objected
only to the particular images and words that he had requested.84 Kennedy conceded that
these cases might be distinguishable from that of Phillips. But he emphasized that they,
too, involved “bakers who objected to a requested cake on the basis of conscience,” and
he noted that the Commission’s reasoning, in two respects, “could reasonably be
interpreted as being inconsistent” with its treatment of Phillips’ claim.85 First, the
Commission had concluded in Phillips’ case that “any message the requested wedding
cake would carry would be attributed to the customer, not to the baker,” 86 but it had not
addressed this argument in the other cases. Second, the Commission had ruled in favor of
the other bakers in part because they were willing to provide other products to their
religious customers, but it had “dismissed Phillips’ willingness to sell ‘birthday cakes,
shower cakes, [and] cookies and brownies’… to gay and lesbian customers as
irrelevant.”87
Justice Kennedy’s opinion may have been a masterpiece for himself and his
judicial legacy, but his animus reasoning was highly contentious 88 and, in any event, was
indeterminate in scope. Two dissenting Justices found the reasoning utterly
unpersuasive.89 But even for those who joined Kennedy’s 7–Justice majority opinion,90
the Court’s animus rationale was hardly clear-cut. Especially unclear was the relative
importance of the commissioners’ statements, on the one hand, and the other CADA
cases, on the other. Further clouding the scope of the Court’s holding, moreover, were
two concurring opinions addressing the significance of the other CADA cases. Five of the
seven Justices who joined Kennedy’s opinion also wrote or supported one of these two
concurrences. And these five were divided on the question of whether the differing
outcomes in the other CADA cases, without more, necessarily required a ruling in favor
As the Colorado Court of Appeals explained, the Commission “found that the bakeries did not
refuse the patron’s request because of his creed, but rather because of the offensive nature of the
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of Phillips. Two Justices said no; the other three said yes.
In the first concurrence, Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Breyer, argued that the
other cases were relevant only to the extent that their reasoning suggested hostility to
Phillips’ religion. The differing results, she said, were fully justified, because the cases
were readily and obviously distinguishable. According to Kagan, the other bakers did not
violate CADA by discriminating on a prohibited ground—religion—because they would
not have made the requested anti-same-sex-marriage cakes for any customers, whatever
their religion.91 By contrast, she argued, Phillips did discriminate against the same-sex
couple on a prohibited ground—sexual orientation—because they “requested a wedding
cake that Phillips would have made for an opposite-sex couple.”92 The different outcomes
“could thus have been justified by a plain reading and neutral application of Colorado
law—untainted by any bias against a religious belief.”93
In the second concurrence, Justice Gorsuch strongly disagreed in an opinion that
was joined by Justice Alito and supported by Justice Thomas in his own separate
opinion.94 According to Gorsuch, it did not matter that Phillips would have been willing
to make an identical cake, bearing neither words nor content-laden images, for an
opposite-sex couple. Because the cake here was requested specifically for a same-sex
wedding celebration, it was a cake “celebrating same-sex marriage” no less than the
cakes bearing specific messages in the other cases were cakes “denigrating same-sex
marriage.”95 Thus, in his view, Phillips and the other bakers were similarly situated. None
of them “actually intended to refuse service because of a customer’s protected
characteristic,” because “they would not sell the requested cakes to anyone, while they
would sell other cakes to members of the protected class (as well as to anyone else).” 96
The bakers in the other CADA cases “would have refused to sell a cake denigrating
same-sex marriage to an atheist customer,” but Phillips likewise “would have refused to
91
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sell a cake celebrating same-sex marriage to a heterosexual customer.”97 As a result, “it
was the kind of cake, not the kind of customer, that mattered to the bakers.” 98 In deciding
the cases differently, Gorsuch concluded, the Commission had “failed to act neutrally by
applying a consistent legal rule.”99
It remains to be seen whether a majority of the current Court (now the postKennedy Court) would agree with Justice Kagan or instead with Justice Gorsuch. Justice
Kagan’s opinion was joined by Justice Breyer, and Justice Sotomayor joined a dissenting
opinion in Masterpiece that shared Kagan’s perspective on this point, finding the other
CADA cases properly and easily distinguishable.100 On the other side, Justice Alito
joined the opinion of Justice Gorsuch, and Justice Thomas likewise indicated his
agreement. That leaves Chief Justice Roberts, who joined Kennedy’s opinion but neither
of the concurrences, and the newly appointed Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett, who did
not participate in Masterpiece. If two or more of these three Justices were to adopt
Gorsuch’s reasoning and find it controlling in Masterpiece, the scope of the Court’s
decision might be far broader than an initial reading of Kennedy’s opinion would suggest.
Under this understanding, the statements of religious hostility in the adjudicatory record
were not essential to the Court’s holding, nor was the specific reasoning that the
Commission invoked in discussing the other CADA cases. Rather, the Commission’s
disparate results under CADA—finding that the other bakers acted lawfully but that
Phillips did not—were enough to show a violation of the Free Exercise Clause.101
A large number of states (and many cities) have public accommodation laws that,
like Colorado’s, include both sexual orientation and religion as forbidden grounds of
discrimination. Like Colorado, these other jurisdictions are likely to deny exemptions to
religious wedding vendors who object to providing goods or services for same-sex
weddings. Unlike Colorado, the commissions and courts of these other jurisdictions
might be meticulously neutral and respectful in their discussion of the religious objectors
and their religious beliefs. At the same time, if confronted with cases alleging religious
discrimination by vendors who have objected to the specific content of particular
religious messages, the commissions and courts are likely to agree with Justice Kagan’s
opinion in Masterpiece. In other words, they are likely to find unlawful sexual-orientation
discrimination by religious vendors who object to providing goods or services for samesex weddings but no unlawful religious discrimination by vendors who object to
97
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customer requests for specific religious messages opposing same-sex marriage.102
Although such a distinction might seem reasonable, it will not be sufficient if the
Gorsuch opinion is deemed controlling. Instead, the differential case results will be
enough, without more, to trigger a finding of unconstitutional religious animus or, at a
minimum, a presumptive right to a religious exemption under the comparable-treatment
exception to Smith, a presumption that could not be overcome without compelling
justification.103
IV. BEYOND MASTERPIECE: TOWARD A RECONCILIATION OF COMPETING RIGHTS
Given the uncertainties surrounding the Court’s decision, the issues raised by
Masterpiece have not disappeared. They continue to be litigated and are likely to return
to the Supreme Court.104 The question thus becomes: how should the Court resolve these
issues?
As I noted at the outset, the wedding vendor controversy replicates an earlier
debate surrounding the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and it presents a similar question: which
should prevail—equality, on the one hand, or a competing claim of individual freedom,
on the other? In addressing the Civil Rights Act, and in other settings as well, the
Supreme Court’s answer with respect to racial equality has been clear and unequivocal:
the promotion of racial equality overrides competing claims of freedom, including
102
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religious freedom. And the Court has defended this conclusion directly and transparently,
finding that laws preventing racial discrimination satisfy strict scrutiny because they
serve a compelling governmental interest that demands uniform application, even to
religious objectors, thus overriding the objectors’ religious freedom and defeating their
claims for religious exemptions.
Consider, by contrast, the manner in which the Justices, to date, have addressed
the wedding vendor controversy and, more broadly, the issue of religious exemptions
from otherwise applicable laws. Instead of clarity and transparency, we have seen
ambiguity, hair-splitting distinctions, and highly contentious rationales and arguments.
Through its decision—and non-decisions—in Masterpiece, the Supreme Court has
stretched the meaning of religious animus, clouded the rule of Employment Division v.
Smith105 and the scope of its comparable-treatment exception, and left open the possibility
of a far-reaching conception of compelled speech that would exempt even non-religious
objectors from the normal operation of anti-discrimination laws.
I do not doubt that the issues in play are complex and controversial, and I cannot
hope to fully address them here. Even so, I believe that the Court can do better than it
has, and, in the remainder of this Essay, I will offer three suggestions. First, the Court
should reject the compelled speech argument in the wedding vendor context. Second, it
should repudiate the rule of Employment Division v. Smith, bringing back the pre-Smith
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. Under this approach, a substantial burden on
the exercise of religion, without more, is sufficient to trigger a presumptive constitutional
right to a religious exemption—a right that can be overcome if, but only if, the
government can satisfy strict scrutiny. And third, in applying the pre-Smith approach in
the wedding vendor context, the Court should find strict scrutiny satisfied, thereby
rejecting the vendors’ claims for religious exemptions.
A.

THE WEDDING VENDORS’ COMPELLED SPEECH ARGUMENT IS UNPERSUASIVE

In considering the compelled speech argument, the first question, of course, is
whether the creation of a custom-made wedding cake should be regarded as expressive
conduct within the scope of the Free Speech Clause. Other wedding vendor cases have
presented similar questions. For example, is the Free Speech Clause implicated by a
wedding florist’s creation of decorative floral arrangements or by the photography of a
wedding photographer? Is the work of such vendors like that of a musician or artist,
whose work clearly would qualify for free speech protection? In an amici curiae brief in
Masterpiece, two prominent constitutional scholars addressed these issues, contending
that a wedding photographer should be protected by the Free Speech Clause but that a

105

494 U.S. 872 (1990).

baker, no matter how creative and beautiful his cakes, should not.106 The two scholars
apparently could not agree about a wedding florist, their brief being silent on that issue.107
These questions are interesting and difficult, but they ultimately miss the point.
Even if the work of a wedding vendor is sufficiently expressive to fall within the general
scope of the Free Speech Clause, the compelled speech argument hinges on a more
narrow issue: does the vendor’s expressive conduct in fact convey, to a reasonable
observer, the message to which the vendor objects, that is, does it convey his or her
personal approval and endorsement of the same-sex wedding? As discussed earlier, this
seems unlikely. In any event, and more important, the government is not targeting the
vendor’s conduct in order to dictate its expressive content or to require the vendor to
communicate a message of the government’s choosing. As a result, the regulatory action
should not be treated as content-based and therefore should not trigger free speech strict
scrutiny. Rather, the governmental action—forbidding the discriminatory denial of goods
or services, a business practice that normally is neither speech nor expressive conduct
under the Free Speech Clause—should be treated as a content-neutral regulation that has,
at most, an incidental effect on expression.108
As I explained earlier, content-neutral regulations are not immune from free
speech scrutiny, but they generally trigger a relatively lenient balancing test that, in the
current situation, the government can easily satisfy.109 Indeed, as I argue below in
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discussing the Free Exercise Clause, the government here can satisfy even strict scrutiny.
A fortiori, it can satisfy this more forgiving constitutional test.
B.

THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD REJECT THE RULE OF SMITH AND RETURN TO ITS
PRE-SMITH INTERPRETATION OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE

Turning, then, to the free exercise of religion, the current state of American law is
fractured and problematic. In its 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith,110 the
Supreme Court broadly declared that the Free Exercise Clause does not require religious
exemptions from neutral laws of general applicability. In so doing, the Court upended its
earlier interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause, which had prevailed for more than a
quarter century. Now, some three decades later, the Supreme Court is being asked to
change directions once again.111 Four Justices recently have hinted that they might be
inclined to take this step, noting with apparent concern that the Court in Smith
“drastically cut back on the protection provided by the Free Exercise Clause.”112 In my
judgment, the Supreme Court should indeed reverse course once again, rejecting the rule
of Smith and returning to the pre-Smith approach. Such a ruling would simplify and
consolidate the law of free exercise. It would put an end to contentious debates about the
scope of Smith and its exceptions even as it implemented an approach that already
dominates American law due to legislative and state-law developments.
At the time of Smith, the Court might have supposed that its new interpretation of
the Free Exercise Clause would simplify the law by minimizing, if not eliminating,
claims for religious exemptions from otherwise applicable laws. Instead, from 1990 to the
present, there have been continuing requests for religious exemptions in a wide variety of
settings, both under the Free Exercise Clause and under parallel free exercise regimes
created by Congress and the states. The rule of Smith has not settled the law. Instead, the
rule—controversial from the beginning—has been subject to ongoing and mounting
pressure, both in the Supreme Court and in the broader political and legal culture. As
explained earlier, the Court itself, in Smith and in later decisions, compromised whatever
clarity its new doctrine might have provided by recognizing various exceptions to the
general rule that it declared. The comparable-treatment exception, in particular, is
openly gay man from serving as a scoutmaster). But this protection should not be extended to vendors in
the commercial marketplace. Cf. Brush & Nib Studio, LC, 448 P.3d, p. 929 (Bales, J., dissenting)
(“[E]quality prevails when we are dealing with public accommodations such as businesses serving the
public.”).
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exceedingly ambiguous and is potentially capacious. As Masterpiece reveals, moreover,
some Justices are inclined to treat disparate treatment as tantamount to deliberate
religious hostility and animus, rendering the governmental action unconstitutional on that
basis. And in many legal contexts, the rule of Smith has been categorically repudiated and
replaced by legislative action or by state judicial decisions. As a result, the pre-Smith
approach now dominates American law, governing federal law throughout the United
States and state law in a majority of the states.
To be sure, the pre-Smith approach, which commanded overwhelming political
support in the immediate aftermath of Smith,113 has itself become controversial in the last
two decades. Recent state-law RFRA proposals, for instance, have generated fierce
political opposition. But most of the opposition is not directed to the pre-Smith approach
as a general legal standard. Rather, it comes from advocates of equality and
nondiscrimination who believe that religious objectors should not be able to obtain
exemptions when the government is seeking to advance a competing interest in equality,
especially the equality of gays, lesbians, and transgender individuals.114 In other words,
the concern is directed mainly to the outcome of cases like Masterpiece. Addressing this
concern, however, does not require a general rejection of the pre-Smith approach. Instead,
it would be enough to conclude that the promotion of equality provides a compelling
justification sufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny and therefore to overcome the religious
objection. I will return to that issue shortly, defending just such a conclusion. For now,
suffice it to say that the pre-Smith approach already is broadly applicable in the United
States and that it need not be understood to privilege religious freedom at the expense of
equality.
Returning to the pre-Smith interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause would
provide a national standard for resolving claims for religious exemptions. The federal
RFRA, RLUIPA, and comparable state laws would not disappear, but they likely would
(and should) be interpreted to provide essentially the same protection as the Free Exercise
Clause. Americans once again would have the same level of free exercise protection
throughout the United States, and that protection would extend to state as well as federal
laws. Moreover, at least as compared to Smith and its exceptions, the legal standard
would be relatively straightforward and transparent, giving religious objectors
presumptive protection from substantial burdens on the exercise of religion but
permitting the government to overcome that presumption for compelling reasons.
Because it would simplify and consolidate the law, returning to the pre-Smith
approach would be sound as a matter of jurisprudential judgment. It likewise would be
sound as a matter of constitutional principle. As explained earlier, the Free Exercise
113
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Clause is properly understood to protect religious freedom as well as religious equality.
And religious freedom, in its most basic and fundamental sense, means religious
voluntarism—the freedom of individuals to make religious decisions for themselves and
to guide their conduct accordingly.
In her separate opinion in Smith, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, a centrist jurist
much like Justice Kennedy, strongly objected to the Court’s rejection of its earlier
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.115 In so doing, she rebuked the Court for its
failure to understand the importance of religious voluntarism and to recognize that it can
be imperiled even by laws that are neutral and generally applicable, which “can coerce a
person to violate his religious conscience or intrude upon his religious duties just as
effectively as laws aimed at religion.”116 As Justice O’Connor observed, “conduct
motivated by sincere religious belief, like the belief itself, must be at least presumptively
protected by the Free Exercise Clause.”117 But she emphasized that the protection
afforded to religiously motivated conduct was and should be presumptive, not absolute,
adding that courts had shown that they were “quite capable of applying our free exercise
jurisprudence to strike sensible balances between religious liberty and competing state
interests.”118 Indeed, applying the pre-Smith approach in the case at hand, which
concerned the religious use of an otherwise illegal drug, O’Connor found strict scrutiny
satisfied and would have rejected a religious exemption on that basis.119
Justice O’Connor was right to support the Court’s pre-Smith doctrine. The Free
Exercise Clause should honor the value of religious voluntarism by offering presumptive,
but not absolute, protection against laws that substantially burden the exercise of religion.
The aftermath of Smith—complete with doctrinal exceptions and statutory and state-law
variations—has demonstrated unrelenting pressure on the approach that the Court
adopted in that case. Both as a matter of jurisprudential judgment and as a matter of
constitutional principle, the Court should repudiate the rule of Smith and return to its
prior doctrine.
C.

PREVENTING DISCRIMINATION PROVIDES A COMPELLING JUSTIFICATION THAT
OVERRIDES WEDDING VENDORS’ FREE EXERCISE RIGHTS
Under the constitutional doctrine that the Supreme Court should apply, the Free
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Exercise Clause requires religious exemptions from laws that substantially burden the
exercise of religion unless the government can satisfy strict scrutiny. As applied to
wedding vendors who object on religious grounds, the legal penalties that public
accommodation laws entail, including fines and judicial orders, rather clearly qualify as
substantial burdens.120 The laws impose substantial coercive pressure on the objecting
vendors, impairing their freedom to make religious choices and to act upon those choices
as a matter of religious conscience. Even so, their right to an exemption is presumptive,
not absolute. It can be overcome if the government can satisfy strict scrutiny.
To satisfy strict scrutiny in the religious exemption context, a law must serve a
compelling governmental interest that requires the law’s application, without exception,
even to the religious objectors. Strict scrutiny is a demanding test, one that the
government cannot easily satisfy. Exactly how demanding is a matter of debate. Justice
O’Connor’s understanding of the test—that it calls for “sensible balances between
religious liberty and competing state interests”121—might suggest that the test is flexible
enough to permit the denial of exemptions in many cases. In the aftermath of Smith,
however, the federal RFRA, as well as RLUIPA and the various state-law RFRAs, have
adopted statutory definitions of strict scrutiny that could be read to require a test that is
quite demanding indeed. According to these statutes, the government cannot
“substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion,” that is, it must grant a religious
exemption, unless it can “demonstrate[ ] that application of the burden to the person—(1)
is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”122 Even this language,
however, is capable of stronger or more moderate readings. Indeed, at the same time that
it adopted this language for the federal RFRA, Congress noted with approval Justice
O’Connor’s reference to “sensible balances.”123
As I have suggested, one reason for returning to pre-Smith law under the Free
Exercise Clause is to simplify the law of free exercise. In furtherance of this objective,
the Supreme Court should declare that the test of strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise
Clause is identical to the test adopted by Congress in RFRA and RLUIPA, a declaration
that probably would induce state courts likewise to adopt the same approach in
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interpreting their state-law RFRAs and state constitutional law.124 The Court should
further declare that free exercise strict scrutiny should be understood and applied
vigorously, with keen recognition of the fundamental value of religious voluntarism. At
the same time, there must be room for the government to vindicate its compelling
interests. The test should be strict but not always fatal, demanding but not impossible to
satisfy. Not every claim for a religious exemption can or should be granted.
In the wedding vendor context, the government presents a justification that is
sufficient to satisfy even this demanding version of strict scrutiny. Its interest, the
prevention of discrimination against gay and lesbian couples, readily qualifies as
compelling. The more difficult question is whether this interest requires that the law be
applied, without exception, even to the religious objectors. After all, the disadvantaged
couples generally will be able to obtain the same goods or services elsewhere, with
minimal inconvenience and little if any tangible injury. Accordingly, one might argue,
the government can accommodate religious objectors without undermining its general
interest in preventing discrimination. The couples will not be denied the goods or services
that they seek; they simply will not obtain them from the particular vendors who object.
This argument is not implausible, but it should be rejected. It is true that the
discrimination of wedding vendors causes no significant tangible harm to same-sex
couples. But they suffer a more serious injury: the indignity of being denied goods or
services by a commercial business that serves the general public. The legislative
judgment reflected in the challenged laws is powerful and persuasive: that full equality
for gays and lesbians includes a right to equal treatment—and the equal treatment of their
weddings and marriages—in the commercial sphere. And the legislature is free to
conclude that this right to equal treatment can tolerate no exceptions, not even for
religious objectors.125
In addressing comparable issues arising under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
Supreme Court has concluded that the government has a compelling interest in redressing
racial discrimination and that this interest does not permit exceptions for religious
objectors. In the particular context of public accommodations, it has ruled against a
commercial vendor who refused, on religious grounds, to serve African-American
customers.126 Likewise, and more recently, the Court has made it clear that commercial
employers cannot rely on religious objections to avoid the Civil Rights Act’s prohibition
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on racial discrimination in employment.127 The Court has applied similar reasoning even
outside the commercial sphere and, notably, even when the religious objector was
discriminating only against individuals who engaged in interracial dating or interracial
marriage. Thus, in Bob Jones University v. United States,128 the Court rejected the free
exercise claims of religious schools that sought tax-exempt status despite their violation
of a governmental policy forbidding racial discrimination. The Justices concluded that the
governmental policy served a compelling interest—the eradication of racial
discrimination in education—and that the policy properly applied, without exception,
even to the religious objectors, including a religious school that admitted students of all
races but that prohibited interracial dating and interracial marriage on the basis of
religious doctrine.129
If extended to sexual orientation and religious objections to same-sex marriage,
these various precedents, taken together, strongly support the conclusion that the
government has a compelling justification for rejecting religious exemptions. To be sure,
one could attempt to distinguish these precedents by arguing that racial discrimination is
uniquely odious in the United States, linked as it is to the grotesque history of African
slavery and its continuing legacy. 130 But at least in the commercial sphere, legislatures
should be free to treat other forms of discrimination, including discrimination based on
sexual orientation, in a similar manner.131 The Court therefore should follow its
precedents with respect to race,132 concluding that here, too, the government satisfies
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strict scrutiny and therefore overcomes the wedding vendors’ claims under the Free
Exercise Clause.133
V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
I have discussed the complexities of American free speech and free exercise law,
especially as they relate to the wedding vendor controversy, and I have offered three
suggestions for resolving this dispute and for improving and clarifying the law. First, the
Supreme Court should reject the wedding vendors’ compelled speech argument. Second,
the Court should repudiate Employment Division v. Smith134 and reinstate its earlier
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. And third, applying that interpretation in the
wedding vendor context, it should find strict scrutiny satisfied and therefore should reject
the vendors’ free exercise claims.
I believe that my suggestions are sound, but even if I am mistaken, I am confident
that the current state of the law is unacceptable. The law of free exercise should be
transparent, not opaque, and it should be uniform, not piecemeal. And the wedding
vendor controversy should be resolved, through forthright judicial balancing, as the
conflict of competing values that it is: the equality of same-sex couples, on the one hand,
and the religious freedom of the objecting vendors, on the other.

The government’s satisfaction of strict scrutiny also provides an additional reason for rejecting
the wedding vendors’ compelled speech argument. As discussed earlier, I do not believe that the Free
Speech Clause should trigger strict scrutiny in this context. But even if it does, the government should
still prevail.
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